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MARK PARSONS; BRANDON BRADLEY; SCOTT GANDY; ROBERT HELLIN; JOSEPH F. BRUCE; JOSEPH W. UTSLER,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE; FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION,
Defendants-Appellees.
   No. 16-2440
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Michigan at Detroit.
No. 2:14-cv-10071—Robert H. Cleland, District Judge.
Argued: October 11, 2017
Decided and Filed: December 18, 2017
Before: BOGGS, BATCHELDER, and KETHLEDGE, Circuit Judges.


_________________________
OPINION
_________________________

ALICE M. BATCHELDER, Circuit Judge. Juggalos are fans of the musical group “Insane Clown Posse.” In 2011, the National Gang Intelligence Center labeled Juggalos “a loosely-organized hybrid gang.” A group of self-identified Juggalos brought Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) claims against the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) and Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”), asserting that the gang designation violated their First and Fifth Amendment rights. The district court determined that the gang designation was not a final agency action and dismissed the suit. We agree and affirm.



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FEDERAL LABOR RELATIONS AUTHORITY,
Petitioner,
v.
MICHIGAN ARMY NATIONAL GUARD,
Respondent.
   No. 17-3128
On Application for Enforcement of an
Order of the Federal Labor Relations Authority;
No. CH-CA-14-0475.
Argued: October 4, 2017
Decided and Filed: December 18, 2017
Before: CLAY, ROGERS, and SUTTON, Circuit Judges.


_________________________
OPINION
_________________________

ROGERS, Circuit Judge. This dispute concerns the federal labor rights of National Guard technicians, who are covered by the Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute (“FSLMRS”), 5 U.S.C. §§ 7101–7135, but who may be disciplined by the state Guard generally without federal review. During administrative proceedings related to the termination of two such technicians, the Michigan Army National Guard (the “Guard”) sent a letter to the employees’ union representative that could be read as temporarily forbidding all private communication between union representatives and employees of the Guard. Before us for enforcement is a determination by the Federal Labor Relations Authority (“FLRA”) that this letter violated federal labor law rights under the FSLMRS. The parties essentially argue past each other. The Guard argues that the letter—interpreted as a prohibition limited to ex parte termination-related contacts with potential employee witnesses—is intertwined with the Guard’s termination process and accordingly not reviewable by the FLRA. The FLRA argues that the letter—instead interpreted as a wholesale (albeit temporary) prohibition on contact by all Guard employees with union representatives regardless of purpose—violates technicians’ FSLMRS rights. Accepting the FLRA’s arguable but somewhat implausible interpretation of the letter under deferential substantial-evidence review, the letter did violate the FSLMRS and was within the purview of the FLRA. So holding, we need not address the Guard’s various jurisdictional and merits arguments regarding what the FLRA did not find to be before it: a temporary prohibition limited to ex parte witness contacts related to the technician-termination proceeding. While it is accordingly proper to enforce the FLRA’s order, a modification to the proposed order is required to conform it more precisely to the basis of the FLRA’s decision.