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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
BLAKE CHILDRESS,
Defendant-Appellant.
   No. 16-6410
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Tennessee at Greeneville.
No. 2:12-cr-00071-1—J. Ronnie Greer, District Judge.
Argued: October 3, 2017
Decided and Filed: October 30, 2017
Before: CLAY, ROGERS, and SUTTON, Circuit Judges.


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OPINION
_________________________

CLAY, Circuit Judge. Defendant Blake Childress appeals the district court’s order imposing a special condition of supervised release pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3583, following his federal conviction for being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) and state court convictions for incest and aggravated assault. For the reasons set forth below, we AFFIRM.



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COURTNEY CATES; BRIAN STOVER; JASON MILLER, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
CRYSTAL CLEAR TECHNOLOGIES, LLC; CARBINE & ASSOCIATES, LLC; TOLLGATE VILLAGE ASSOCIATION INC.; BRIDGEMORE VILLAGE OWNERS’ ASSOCIATION INC.; BRIDGEMORE DEVELOPMENT GROUP, LLC; TOLLGATE FARMS, LLC,
Defendants-Appellees.
   No. 16-6714
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Tennessee at Nashville.
No. 3:16-cv-00008—Aleta Arthur Trauger, District Judge.
Argued: July 26, 2017
Decided and Filed: October 30, 2017
Before: COLE, Chief Judge; BATCHELDER and MOORE, Circuit Judges.


_________________________
OPINION
_________________________

COLE, Chief Judge. The three named plaintiffs brought a purported class action alleging that the developers of their neighborhoods created agreements that violated both state and federal law by requiring the neighborhoods’ homeowners to pay for basic telecommunications services provided by Crystal Clear Technologies, LLC (“Crystal Clear”), an entity owned and controlled by the developers. The district court dismissed the plaintiffs’ federal claims for failure to state a claim and subsequently denied as futile the plaintiffs’ motion seeking leave to file an amended complaint. We affirm in part and reverse in part the district court’s denial of the plaintiffs’ motion seeking leave to file an amended complaint.