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GIASSON AEROSPACE SCIENCE, INC.; GIASSON DESIGN INC.,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
RCO ENGINEERING INC.,
Defendant-Appellee.
   No. 16-1769
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Michigan at Detroit.
No. 2:14-cv-11358—Robert H. Cleland, District Judge.
Argued: August 3, 2017v Decided and Filed: September 20, 2017
Before: NORRIS, SUHRHEINRICH, and GRIFFIN, Circuit Judges.


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OPINION
_________________________

Plaintiffs Giasson Aerospace Science, Inc. and Giasson Design Inc. (collectively referred to as “Giasson”) appeal the district court’s dismissal of their complaint against defendant RCO Engineering Incorporated pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Giasson seeks to undo a settlement agreement the parties reached to resolve prior litigation between them, and argues this case should proceed as an independent action in equity for relief from judgment as permitted under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(d)(1), the rule’s so-called “savings clause.” However, relief pursuant to such an action is “available only to prevent a grave miscarriage of justice.” United States v. Beggerly, 524 U.S. 38, 47 (1998). Because Giasson’s allegations do not satisfy that “demanding standard[,]” id., we affirm the district court’s judgment.



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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
$31,000.00 IN U.S. CURRENCY, et al.,
Defendants,

TAIWAN WIGGINS; DALANTE ALLISON,
Claimants-Appellants.
   No. 16-4279
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Ohio at Cleveland.
No. 1:16-cv-01581—Patricia A. Gaughan, District Judge.
Decided and Filed: September 20, 2017
Before: COLE, Chief Judge; BATCHELDER and MOORE, Circuit Judges.


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OPINION
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ALICE M. BATCHELDER, Circuit Judge. The federal law governing civil in rem forfeiture actions gives the government authority to seize items it suspects were used in furtherance of criminal activity and to commence civil in rem proceedings against the property without charging the property’s owner with a crime. See United States v. Seventeen Thousand Nine Hundred Dollars ($17,900.00) in U.S. Currency, 859 F.3d 1085, 1087 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (explaining the practice of civil forfeiture); see also Leonard v. Texas, 137 S. Ct. 847, 848–49 (2017) (Thomas, J.) (statement respecting the denial of certiorari) (describing some abuses in the administration of civil forfeiture laws in the United States and questioning the constitutionality of such laws). Federal agents and entities have significant latitude to pursue these claims, from special discovery provisions written into the governing rules to a burden of proof that is lower than required in standard criminal cases. But this latitude has its limits, and this case requires us to define some of these limits. The district court granted the government’s motion to strike Taiwan Wiggins’s and Dalante Allison’s claims to currency seized from each man at the Cleveland Hopkins International Airport. Each man’s claim asserted that he owned the currency that had been taken from his suitcase. The district court recited the facts as alleged by the government, found that each claim presented “nothing more than a naked assertion of ownership,” and held that, under Sixth Circuit precedent, Wiggins and Allison lacked the standing necessary to pursue their claims.

In many ways, this civil forfeiture action looks routine, for federal courts have developed well-settled principles concerning a forfeiture claimant’s need to demonstrate both Article III and statutory standing. But this case comes to us in a procedural posture unlike most civil forfeiture actions—the government apparently moved to dismiss the claim before it engaged in any discovery. Its basic argument before the district court and on appeal is that the claimant’s pleadings must do more than assert a bare ownership in the res that is subject to forfeiture, and that the claimant’s pleadings must provide the government sufficient detail to draft interrogatories allowing it to test the claimant’s claim of ownership. As we will explain, the procedural rules governing civil forfeiture actions do not demand such a heightened standard. Accordingly, we REVERSE the district court’s order granting the government’s motion to strike the claim and REMAND for further proceedings.



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ISLAMIC CENTER OF NASHVILLE,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
STATE OF TENNESSEE; CHARLIE CALDWELL; TENNESSEE STATE BOARD OF EQUALIZATION,
Defendants-Appellees.
   No. 17-5045
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Tennessee at Nashville.
No. 3:16-cv-02498—Aleta Arthur Trauger, District Judge.
Decided and Filed: September 20, 2017
Before: MERRITT, MOORE, and ROGERS, Circuit Judges.


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OPINION
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KAREN NELSON MOORE, Circuit Judge. This case arises from a property tax assessed against an otherwise-tax-exempt religious nonprofit, the Islamic Center of Nashville (ICN), for a period of time during which it had formally transferred title to a bank through a financing vehicle called an ijara agreement that complies with Islamic doctrine. After ICN regained title to the property, it asked the Tennessee State Board of Equalization to apply its tax exemption retroactively to cover the period of time during which the bank had held title to the property, but both an Administrative Law Judge and then the State Board’s Assessment Appeals Commission denied ICN’s requests. The Tennessee statute governing tax appeals names the appropriate state chancery court as the next step for obtaining judicial review after these administrative adjudicators have first addressed the case. Because ICN instead filed suit in federal court, leveling a range of constitutional, federal statutory, and state statutory claims that would (on its theory) vitiate its obligation to pay taxes of the kind assessed, and because Tennessee’s statutory provision for state-court appeal provides a plain, speedy, and efficient alternative to federal-court review, the Tax Injunction Act bars ICN’s suit in federal court. Therefore, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court dismissing ICN’s case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.



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MELISA RICHMOND,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
RUBAB HUQ, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
   No. 16-2560
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Michigan at Ann Arbor.
No. 5:14-cv-14892—John Corbett O’Meara, District Judge.
Argued: July 28, 2017
Decided and Filed: September 20, 2017
Before: MOORE, STRANCH, and DONALD, Circuit Judges.


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OPINION
_________________________

BERNICE BOUIE DONALD, Circuit Judge. Plaintiff Melisa Richmond was incarcerated in the Wayne County Jail from December 26, 2012 through February 13, 2013. While in the custody of the Jail, Richmond received treatment for a self-inflicted burn wound on her chest as well as for psychological needs. Richmond contends that she received constitutionally inadequate treatment for her burn wound, which necessitated skin grafting surgery shortly after her release from the Jail’s custody. She also contends that she was unconstitutionally deprived of her psychiatric medication for over two weeks while in custody. The district court below granted summary judgment in favor of the Defendants on the grounds that Richmond failed to show a constitutional violation. For the reasons described below, we REVERSE in part and AFFIRM in part the ruling of the district court.



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IN RE: SCOTT A. CONZELMANN,
Movant.
   No. 17-3270
On Motion to Authorize the Filing of a Second or
Successive Application for Habeas Corpus Relief.
Nos. 1:11-cr-00035-1; 1:14-cv-01281—Christopher A. Boyko, District Judge.
United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio at Cleveland
Decided and Filed: September 20, 2017
Before: GIBBONS, SUTTON, and THAPAR, Circuit Judges.


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ORDER
_________________________

Scott A. Conzelmann, a federal prisoner proceeding pro se, moves this court for an order authorizing the district court to consider a second or successive § 2255 motion to vacate his sentence. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244(a), 2255(h).

. . .

We therefore DENY Conzelmann’s application for leave to file a second or successive § 2255 motion.